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A B S T R A C T
This article focuses on the division of labor between evolution and development in solving sequential, state-
dependent decision problems. Currently, behavioral ecologists tend to use dynamic programming methods to
study such problems. These methods are successful at predicting animal behavior in a variety of contexts.
However, they depend on a distinct set of assumptions. Here, we argue that behavioral ecology will benefit from
drawing more than it currently does on a complementary collection of tools, called reinforcement learning
methods. These methods allow for the study of behavior in highly complex environments, which conventional
dynamic programming methods do not feasibly address. In addition, reinforcement learning methods are well-
suited to studying how biological mechanisms solve developmental and learning problems. For instance, we can
use them to study simple rules that perform well in complex environments. Or to investigate under what con-
ditions natural selection favors fixed, non-plastic traits (which do not vary across individuals), cue-driven-switch
plasticity (innate instructions for adaptive behavioral development based on experience), or developmental
selection (the incremental acquisition of adaptive behavior based on experience). If natural selection favors
developmental selection, which includes learning from environmental feedback, we can also make predictions
about the design of reward systems. Our paper is written in an accessible manner and for a broad audience,
though we believe some novel insights can be drawn from our discussion. We hope our paper will help advance
the emerging bridge connecting the fields of behavioral ecology and reinforcement learning.
1. Introduction
Each organism faces a host of adaptive problems. These range from
short-term problems, like foraging under the risk of predation, to long-
term problems, like allocating resources among growth, maintenance,
and reproduction. Solving an adaptive problem entails generating an
adaptive phenotype, ranging from behavioral repertoires to develop-
mental patterns. In behavioral ecology, an adaptive phenotype refers to
one that improves fitness relative to other phenotypes. The best measure
of fitness depends on the species and the conditions in which it evolves.
Fitness is often defined as the long-term growth rate of a lineage
(Donaldson-Matasci et al., 2008; Lewontin and Cohen, 1969;
McNamara et al., 2016; Starrfelt and Kokko, 2012). In practice, biolo-
gists often measure proxies for fitness, including general measures like
survival and reproduction, or domain-specific measures like energetic
returns from foraging.
Here, we focus on processes that solve adaptive problems over two
timescales: evolution and development. Evolution refers to changes
across generations in the frequencies of types in a population, whether
those changes be in genes, developmental systems, or phenotypic traits.
Natural selection, the differential reproductive success of inherited
variations, is the only known evolutionary process that results in
adaptation. Development refers to changes within an organism from
conception to death. Learning, the acquisition of new information,
abilities, or responses as a result of experience, is one developmental
process that can produce adaptive behavior. Across generations natural
selection shapes learning mechanisms, which enable organisms to ac-
quire adaptive behavior within their lifetimes. This behavior, in turn,
provides the phenotypic variation upon which subsequent natural se-
lection acts. In general, developmental processes, such as learning, both
result from and contribute to evolution (Baldwin, 1896; Hinton and
Nowlan, 1987; Laland et al., 2001; Maynard Smith et al., 1985; Nolfi
et al., 1994; Oudeyer and Smith, 2016; Oyama et al., 2001; Staddon,
2016; Watson and Szathmáry, 2016; West-Eberhard, 2003).
The best way to solve a particular adaptive problem (i.e., to max-
imize fitness) depends on the properties of the environment. If the
environment is constant across time and space, natural selection may
favor fixed, non-plastic traits, which some call innate, canalized, or
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reliably developing (Mameli and Bateson, 2011; Samuels, 2004). For
instance, all zebras have stripes. This trait is not developmentally
plastic. By contrast, if the environment varies over time and space,
natural selection might favor phenotypic plasticity: the ability of a gen-
otype to produce a range of different phenotypes depending on local
environmental conditions and an individual’s state (Schlichting and
Pigliucci, 1998). In some cases, phenotypic plasticity can be cue-driven
and switch-like, in which natural selection equips the organism with
innate, rather than learned, instructions for adaptive behavior. Even if
an organism learns parameter values of the environment (e.g., the en-
vironment is predator rich), it does not learn which behavior is adaptive
in this state (e.g., in a predator-rich environment, develop defensive
armor). This is precisely what happens in some Daphnia species, in
which cues to predators trigger the development of defensive armor
(Agrawal et al., 1999). In other cases, phenotypic plasticity is guided by
a process of developmental selection, in which current phenotypes are
shaped by the consequences of past phenotypes, including but not
limited to learning from past behaviors (Snell-Rood, 2012). With de-
velopmental selection, and learning in particular, a division of labor
arises: natural selection shapes the learning mechanisms and the de-
veloping organism learns how to behave adaptively. Learning by trying
out different behaviors is ubiquitous in nature. For example, stickleback
fish have evolved learning mechanisms that allow them to process food
more efficiently by generating different behaviors and pursuing those
that work best (Dill, 1983).
We make two arguments in this paper. First, behavioral ecology
should draw on reinforcement learning (RL) methods (Sutton and
Barto, 1998) more than it currently does. Although inspired by learning
theories of psychology (Skinner, 1953; Thorndike, 1911), as we treat it
here, RL methods refer to a collection of machine learning algorithms,
rather than to a theory of how actual animal learning works. Although
biologists are increasingly using RL methods to study adaptive behavior
(e.g., Dridi and Lehmann, 2014, 2015, 2016; Enquist et al., 2016;
Frank, 1996, 1997; Whalen et al., 2015), we are not aware of any pa-
pers in behavioral ecology that explain RL methods and compare them
with stochastic dynamic programing (SDP) methods, which are widely
used by behavioral ecologists. We add a note on terminology: because
the most widely used RL algorithms can be seen as approximate SDP
methods (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis, 1996; Powell, 2007), we use the term
‘SDP methods’ to refer to ‘non-RL SDP methods’. Second, RL methods
are well suited to studying the conditions in which natural selection
favors fixed traits, cue-driven-switch plasticity, or developmental se-
lection. By using RL methods in theoretical models, we can study when
RL as a mechanism of behavioral adaptation might evolve, as opposed
to fixed traits or cue-driven-switch strategies.
Our paper is written in an accessible manner and for a broad au-
dience. Sections 1–3 are designed for students and scholars working
either in behavioral ecology or RL, without any background in the other
field. Sections 4–5 may include new insights for some experts. In Sec-
tion 2, we describe sequential, state-dependent decision problems. In
Section 3, we discuss SDP methods. In Section 4, we introduce RL
methods, and discuss when these can be more suitable than SDP
methods. And, in Section 5, we revisit the division of labor between
evolutionary and developmental adaptation, and briefly discuss how RL
methods can help us understand the evolution of behavioral mechan-
isms.
We focus on two methods for computing optimal behavior in
models: SDP and RL. We do not discuss psychological research related
to RL and its integration into behavioral ecology. Other scholars have
called for better integration of psychological learning theories and data
into optimality models of behavior, thus bridging function and me-
chanism (Kacelnik, 2012; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1997; McNamara and
Houston, 2009; Trimmer et al., 2012). Such integration has great value,
because it leads to new discoveries and unifies knowledge from ex-
perimental psychology with behavioral ecology; for instance, by illu-
minating whether well-established animal learning processes are able
to perform close to the optima predicted by various models. However,
our focus is on computational methods, not biological mechanisms. Our
central point is that RL methods allow biologists to make predictions
about behavior in situations that are difficult or infeasible to study
using SDP methods. Although we greatly appreciate simple models for
the insights they provide (many of our own models fit this category),
problems of high complexity sometimes require increased model com-
plexity, which may trade-off insight for prediction (Levins, 1966).
2. Sequential, state-dependent decision problems
In the 1970s, behavioral ecologists started using optimization
methods to study animal behavior. These methods assume that natural
selection has designed organisms so that their behavior maximizes fit-
ness. For example, in the typical foraging model, organisms are as-
sumed to maximize the rate of energy gain (Stephens and Krebs, 1986).
Initial models assumed that organisms made only a single decision or
multiple decisions that are independent of each other. These models are
successful at predicting behavior in a variety of contexts, but they are
not well suited for studying sequential, state-dependent decision pro-
blems, in which payoffs and costs depend on a sequence of decisions
made over extended periods of time. Therefore, biologists turned to
optimal control theory (Bellman, 1957) to model sequential, state-de-
pendent decision problems (Clark and Mangel, 2000; Houston et al.,
1988; Houston and McNamara, 1999; Krebs et al., 1978; Mangel, 1990,
2015; Mangel and Clark, 1988; McNamara and Houston, 1986; for
explanation tailored to psychologists, see Frankenhuis et al., 2013).
Consider a bird that needs to find enough food each day to survive
the non-breeding season (alternatively, the bird could maximize a
balance between survival and reproductive success; the example is
taken from Houston et al., 1988). Birds vary day-to-day in their energy
reserves, based in part on their previous foraging decisions. Reserves
increase through food consumption and decrease through metabolic
expenditure. If energy levels drop below a threshold, the bird dies of
starvation. On the flip side, energy reserves do not continue to increase
indefinitely with consumption; at some point, the fitness benefit of
additional reserves is outweighed by the cost. The bird can choose to
forage in one of a fixed number of locations on each day. Each location
has a characteristic probability of death from predation and a dis-
tribution of energetic returns from foraging. Further, the most pro-
ductive habitats are also the riskiest; because predators will be drawn to
the locations where most birds forage, there is a higher probability of
being killed in more productive patches. A researcher may wonder: In
which location(s) should a bird forage? And, how should this choice
vary as a function of current energy reserves and time to the end of the
season?
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are discrete-time versions of op-
timal control problems and provide a mathematical framework for
studying sequential, state-dependent decision problems. In these deci-
sion problems, time is broken up into discrete steps and outcomes are
partly random and partly under the control of the decision maker. An
MDP has four components:
1. States: A set of possible, relevant configurations of a system (such as
an organism and its environment).
2. Actions: A set of (perhaps state-specific) actions available to the
agent
3. Transition function: A function that probabilistically assigns the next
state based on the current state and chosen action.
4. Reward function: A function that assigns an immediate reward based
on the current state and chosen action (note: ‘reward’ can mean
different things depending on the application, and it can include
costs too).
Different fields use different terminology in describing MDPs.
Behavioral ecologists use the term ‘agent’ to refer to organisms. They
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distinguish between the ‘state’ of the organism and the ‘state’ of the
environment. In RL, the term ‘agent’ refers to an entity that uses an
algorithm to interact with and learn about its environment. These
agents are situated in environments that can be in different states. In
RL, the ‘environment’ includes both the organism itself (i.e., conditions
internal to the body envelope) and its external environment (Sutton and
Barto, 1998). In Sections 2 and 3, we use the terms ‘agent’ and ‘en-
vironment’ as used in behavioral ecology: an ‘agent’ refers to an or-
ganism and the ‘environment’ refers to the organism’s external en-
vironment. In Section 4, we use the terms ‘agent’ and ‘environment’ as
they are used in RL.
The possible energy levels may represent the bird’s state. The bird
has the same action set each day, choosing a location in which to
forage. The transition function probabilistically assigns the bird a new
energy level based on its current level (current state) and the choice of
foraging location (chosen action). The reward function probabilistically
determines whether the bird survives a day based on its current energy
and the choice of foraging location. By formulating a state-dependent
decision problem as an MDP, the task becomes finding an optimal policy
that, for each possible state, specifies the action choice that maximizes
the expected cumulative future return, a measure of total reward over
time. In behavioral ecology, this means finding a policy that maximizes
expected fitness. In the bird example, an optimal policy instructs the
bird where to forage based on its current energy reserve and the current
time period, in order to maximize the probability that it survives the
non-breeding season.
3. Stochastic dynamic programming
In order to predict animal behavior in sequential, state-dependent
decision problems, such as foraging, behavioral ecologists often use
Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) methods (Clark and Mangel,
2000; Houston and McNamara, 1999; Mangel, 1990, 2015; Mangel and
Clark, 1988; for an explanation tailored to psychologists, see
Frankenhuis et al., 2013). In SDP, the decision problem is broken down
into a collection of simpler sub-problems, and then each of those sub-
problems is solved once and the solutions stored. Behavioral ecologists
typically use the method of backward induction, starting at the terminal
time period and then working backwards to the first time period. The
algorithm begins by recording the rewards associated with each of the
possible final states. It then takes one step back in time and notes all of
the penultimate states it could be in. For each of these states, the al-
gorithm computes and records the action that will maximize the ex-
pected reward from here on out. It repeatedly performs this procedure
until it reaches the first time period, taking one step back at a time and
then computing and recording the best action for each state. Once it
reaches the initial time period, the algorithm will have visited all pos-
sible states and computed the optimal policy, which instructs the agent
on how to behave for each state in each time step. SDP is clearly not
intended to mimic psychological processes used by animals. Instead, “it
identifies the optimal strategy from the perspective of an observer,
without discussing how the decision maker may achieve it” (Kacelnik,
2012, p. 25).
We can use SDP to find an optimal policy for making decisions in a
single environmental condition or across a range of different conditions.
Environmental variation can take many different forms, and this var-
iation shapes optimal decisions. Here, we consider a stylized environ-
ment that cycles through one of two possible states during an organ-
ism’s lifetime. Suppose a bird resides either in bountiful conditions or in
meager conditions (e.g., due to temporal differences in rainfall). And,
suppose the bird has no control over which condition it is in. In this
MDP, the external environment is characterized by two conditions, each
with distinct transition and reward probabilities. In the bountiful con-
dition, the probability of finding food, and/or the energetic value of
food, might be higher. As a consequence, a bird foraging in this con-
dition is more likely to move from hunger to satiation than a bird
foraging in a meager condition. The set of state variables that describe a
bird will include its estimate of the current condition and its energy
budget.
An individual bird may never be absolutely certain about the en-
vironmental condition it is currently in. However, the bird may have
access to cues that provide information about the state of the world,
bountiful or meager, and thereby reduce its uncertainty (Dall et al.,
2015; Dunlap and Stephens, 2016; McNamara and Houston, 1980;
Mangel, 1990; Moran, 1992; Nettle et al., 2013; Stamps and
Frankenhuis, 2016; Sultan and Spencer, 2002; Trimmer et al., 2011;
Uller et al., 2015). Cues are observations that are more likely to occur in
certain conditions than others (e.g., smoke is more likely when there is
a fire than when there is not a fire). If cues offer little information for
discriminating between conditions, or sampling cues is too costly
(trading off with investment in other fitness-relevant activities, such as
skill development, avoiding predators, or finding mates), an optimal
policy might invest little or nothing at all in information search and
instead be a compromise solution. For instance, the organism may de-
velop a generalist phenotype, which performs fairly well across con-
ditions, but not great in any particular condition. If cues are reliable,
the policy can include separate instructions (e.g., foraging strategies)
for dealing with each condition, which are triggered once the organism
is sufficiently confident about the current condition it is in.
In order to use SDP methods, we must make two assumptions. First,
the modeler needs to know the transition and reward functions (items 3
and 4 from the list in Section 2). Second, the sets of states, state vari-
ables, actions, and transition and reward functions, must not be so large
that we cannot feasibly compute an optimal policy. Over the past sev-
eral decades, behavioral ecologists have studied a great variety of sig-
nificant problems using models that adhere to these assumptions, pro-
ducing many profound insights (Clark and Mangel, 2000; Houston and
McNamara, 1999; Mangel and Clark, 1988). However, we may not al-
ways want to make these assumptions, for at least two reasons.
The first reason is related to the well-known curse of modeling
(Bellman, 1957): it can be difficult for a modeler to know all the
transition and reward probabilities that determine expected values
needed for SDP computations. The second reason is related to the curse
of dimensionality (Bellman, 1957): as the number of states, state vari-
ables, actions, and transition and reward functions increases, SDP takes
up more and more computational time and resources to find an optimal
policy. Many sequential decision problems, vividly illustrated by games
such as Backgammon, Chess, and Go, cover such a large space of states,
that SDP cannot find an optimal policy within a feasible amount of
time. In behavioral ecology, the behavior of real animals might depend
on interactions between a sizable number of state variables, or animals
might forage in an ecology characterized by a fine-grained and rapidly-
changing structure. Such challenges can vastly increase the state space,
requiring methods other than SDP, or models of such reduced com-
plexity that they do not represent important details. In particular, there
seems to be an emerging interest among behavioral ecologists in RL
methods (Dridi and Lehmann, 2014, 2015, 2016; Enquist et al., 2016;
Fawcett et al., 2014; Whalen et al., 2015). In the next section, we dis-
cuss how RL methods deal with the above challenges.
4. Reinforcement learning
Reinforcement Learning (RL) is a widely used collection of methods
that mitigate both the curse of modeling and the curse of dimension-
ality in ways that allow us to approximate optimal policies for se-
quential, state-dependent decision problems when the transition and
reward probabilities are not explicitly known to the modeler and/or
when the decision problem is highly complex, i.e., spanning a massive
state space. In such situations, using SDP will not be feasible. As we
announced in Section 2, we now use the terms ‘agent’ and ‘environ-
ment’ as they are used in RL. That is, the term ‘agent’ refers to an entity
that implements an algorithm to interact with and learn about an
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environment, and the term ‘environment’ may include an organism’s
internal condition as well as its external environment.
An RL agent’s goal is to learn how to maximize a measure of the
cumulative amount of reward received over the long term while in-
teracting with its environment, updating its policy based on the con-
sequences of its actions. The agent typically knows the actions it can
take and the current state of the environment (though, there are RL
methods in which the agent does not know the current environmental
state; for a tutorial, see Littman, 2009). The agent does not, however,
initially know how to behave optimally (i.e., know which action max-
imizes future reward for any possible state). By interacting with its
environment and observing the consequences of its actions, the agent
can learn to approximate an optimal policy.
In our bird foraging model, we discussed how SDP based on back-
ward induction finds an optimal policy by starting at the last time
period and working back to the first time period. By contrast, an RL
agent starts at the beginning by selecting actions over multiple epi-
sodes. This process results in gradually improving behavior. A key
difference between SDP and RL is that SDP is an ‘offline’ computation.
An offline computation separates finding an optimal policy from using
it. How states are visited in an offline computation in order to update
their values is unrelated to how an agent would visit states as it would
while behaving in the environment. In contrast, an RL algorithm (at
least a ‘model-free’ RL algorithm, something of a misnomer as we dis-
cuss below) updates the values of states as the RL agent visits them
while behaving in its (real or simulated) environment. The RL agent
selects actions that exploit the latest form of its policy, while also in-
troducing exploratory actions in order to improve its policy. RL can
mitigate the curse of dimensionality because in many cases the agent
avoids visiting vast regions of an immense state space in which ex-
pending computational effort does little to improve the approximation
of an optimal policy. This is a major reason that RL methods have had
such striking success in problems with extremely large state spaces,
such as the games Backgammon (Tesauro, 1994) and Go (Silver et al.,
2016, 2017). Conventional SDP algorithms are infeasible for problems
of this size and complexity. Of course, using RL methods implies
abandoning the goal of finding exactly optimal policies, but this is a
small price to pay when high-quality approximations are possible.
Model-free RL methods mitigate the curse of modeling by approx-
imating optimal policies on the basis of many sample trajectories, which
can be generated either by simulations of the agent interacting with its
environment, or by actual interactions of the agent with its real en-
vironment. The term ‘model-free’ for this type of RL algorithm is
something of a misnomer because unless the learning agent interacts
with its real environment, it learns while interacting with a simulation
of its environment, which of course requires an environment model. But
a key advantage of RL over SDP is that it is much easier, for many types
of problems, to simulate an agent interacting with its environment than
it is to acquire explicit knowledge of all the probability distributions
governing the interaction that would be required for a conventional
SDP algorithm. Simulations only require these probability distributions
to be sampled for specific cases, thus avoiding the need to produce at the
start an exhaustive tabulation of all probabilities. Using (pseudo-)
random number generators, computer simulations can produce trajec-
tories of agents behaving in their environments according to an MDP’s
probabilities without ever having to explicitly produce those prob-
abilities. Clearly, in order to accurately simulate trajectories of an MDP
the simulation program needs to be able to simulate state transitions
and rewards conforming to the MDP’s transition and reward prob-
abilities, but these probabilities can be generated by complex processes
within the simulation program without ever directly accessing the
probabilities themselves. As an example, suppose the next state of an
MDP (e.g., predation risk at some future time) is a number whose
probability depends on the output of some random process (e.g., in-
fection rates in predator populations). In special cases, it can be easy to
compute the probabilities of all the possible next states, but often this is
difficult. On the other hand, knowing only how the random process
affects a next state’s probability, it is easy to generate sample next
states. Moreover, samples are needed only for state transitions that
occur in the simulations, which, as pointed out above, can be a small
fraction of all the possible state transitions.
This simulation-based property of RL methods is important for be-
havioral ecology because it can be very difficult and error-prone to infer
realistic transition and reward probabilities from observing behavior in
messy real-world environments (e.g., inferring the probability of being
eaten, if choosing to forage, given a particular level of predation risk).
However, biologists can more easily develop computer programs to
simulate the actions of animals in artificial environments that are based
on empirical data. In other cases, a biologist might learn about optimal
behavior without building an environment model at all, but rather by
collecting sample behavioral trajectories produced by artificial embo-
died RL agents (e.g., robot insects implementing RL algorithms) inter-
acting with real, complex environments.
RL algorithms that learn from simulated (or real) behavioral tra-
jectories as just described are called ‘model-free’ because they only use
models to produce the simulated behavioral trajectories from which
they learn. The simulation model is not really a part of the RL algo-
rithm. A ‘model-based’ RL algorithm, on the other hand, has internal
access to an environment model so that it can combine its trajectory-
focused computations with offline computations like SDP. Agents im-
plementing model-based RL algorithms are capable of ‘offline planning’
by evaluating the consequences of actions that are never actually exe-
cuted in their (possibly simulated) environments. As we will discuss
below, an agent may combine offline planning with model-free
learning, starting out with certain evolved parameter settings that are
subsequently updated through learning (Enquist et al., 2016; Whalen
et al., 2015).
RL approaches allow us to approximate optimal policies for ecolo-
gies that are more complex than those for which SDP is feasible. In our
bird foraging example, location-specific parameters like predation
probability and expected energy gain may vary from season to season.
Incorporating this variation into the model means specifying more
parameters. We may also want to increase the number of actions
available to the agent. Or, we might want to model an ecology with
fine-grained spatial and temporal variation in resources. These kinds of
assumptions result in vastly larger sets of states and actions. In each of
these cases, we can use RL methods to approximate an optimal policy,
but not SDP methods. There are, in fact, many different ways in which
RL methods can be employed to study the kinds of MDPs discussed
above. We do not discuss these methods in detail here (for a thorough
introduction, see Sutton and Barto 1998).
An agent using model-based RL can learn or improve its model on
the basis of its experiences interacting with its environment. An agent
might start out with a partial model, use it for offline planning to decide
how to act, all the while improving the model based on its experienced
state transitions and rewards (Enquist et al., 2016; Whalen et al., 2015).
A model can be learned either passively or actively. Passively learning a
model means that the agent’s need to improve its model does not figure
into how it selects actions. Actively learning a model, on the other
hand, means that the agent’s actions (at least some of them) are selected
for the purpose of obtaining good ‘training data’ for the purpose of
improving the agent’s model. For instance, an active agent might select
actions that are likely to result in observations that maximally reduce
its uncertainty about transition and reward functions (Kruschke, 2008;
Oudeyer and Smith, 2016).
Despite the advantages RL methods offer over SDP methods that we
discussed above, RL methods are not without their own challenges.
They can fail for a variety of reasons. Most obviously, if learning is
based on simulated (rather than real) experience, the simulation model
may not be an adequate model of the agent’s interaction with its actual
environment. Simulation models can be easier to formulate than models
that rely on explicit enumeration of the relevant probabilities, but they
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still must be faithful to the actual circumstances in which the modeled
animal behaves. RL algorithms can mitigate the curse of modeling, but
they cannot eliminate it. Irrespective of computational method (SDP or
RL), one should not confuse models with reality. Models are useful tools
for explanation and prediction, which need to be revised if empirical
observations deviate from model predictions (Box, 1976).
Another challenge in applying RL methods is that of selecting a way
to represent the agent’s policy and/or a function, called a value func-
tion, that guides the agent’s decisions. The usual way to do this is to
select a set of numerical features characterizing the problem’s states,
together with a parameterized functional form, e.g., a multi-layer
neural network, that transforms feature descriptions of states into ac-
tions and/or values. The RL algorithm incrementally adjusts the para-
meters as learning proceeds. Although not altogether different from the
challenge of selecting and discretizing a state space in order to use SDP,
selecting features and parameterized forms able to produce good ap-
proximations to optimal behavior is a challenge for any application of
RL. An application can fail to produce useful predictions as a result of
inappropriate selection of these algorithm details.
In short: RL methods can approximate optimal policies for ecologies
that are more complex than those for which SDP methods are feasible.
RL methods allow agents to learn from sample trajectories, thus fo-
cusing computational effort on regions of the state space that are re-
levant to the problem, while avoiding regions where computational
effort is unlikely to significantly improve the approximation of an op-
timal policy. In addition, RL methods rely on simulation models of
environmental interaction instead of explicit knowledge of all transition
and reward probabilities as required by SDP. Moreover, as we will
argue in the next section, reinforcement learning methods have an
additional benefit: they are well-suited to studying how biological
mechanisms solve developmental and learning problems.
5. Integrative models of evolutionary and developmental
adaptation
Behavioral ecologists commonly assume that, given enough time,
natural selection shapes phenotypic traits, including behavioral strate-
gies, to maximize fitness (which is not to say that every phenotype is
optimally adapted; see below). This phenotypic gambit (Grafen, 1984)
allows researchers to ignore matters of instantiation, such as the un-
derlying genetic architecture or developmental mechanisms (Maynard
Smith et al., 1985). The gambit is a methodological stance that provides
a starting point for empirical research. If observations deviate from
predictions, we need to refine our model; for instance, we may need to
better characterize the problem an animal is solving or the resources it
has available to do so (Epstein, 2008; Levins, 1966; Smaldino, 2017).
The gambit has proven to be useful in behavioral ecology (Gardner,
2009; Mangel, 2015; Maynard Smith, 1978; Mayr, 1983) and is math-
ematically consistent with tenets of evolutionary theory, such as po-
pulation genetics (Grafen, 2014; Hammerstein, 1996), yet it remains
controversial (Fawcett et al., 2013).
By employing the gambit, behavioral ecologists can avoid the
question of whether natural selection equips the organism with in-
structions for adaptive behavior or with the ability to learn adaptive
behavior (but see Kacelnik, 2012; Kacelnik and Bateson, 1997;
McNamara and Houston, 2009). There is, of course, an extensive lit-
erature on the evolution of phenotypic plasticity (Barrett, 2015; Dunlap
and Stephens, 2016; Gomulkiewicz and Kirkpatrick, 1992; McNamara
and Houston, 1980; Mangel, 1990; Moran, 1992; Nettle et al., 2013;
Schlichting and Pigliucci, 1998; Stamps and Frankenhuis, 2016; Sultan
and Spencer, 2002; Trimmer et al., 2011; Uller et al., 2015). Here,
biologists use mathematical models to study in which conditions nat-
ural selection favors plasticity over fixed phenotypes, and how organ-
isms integrate cues coming from different sources, such as genes, epi-
genetic inheritance, prenatal effects, and postnatal experiences (Botero
et al., 2015; Dall et al., 2015; Jablonka et al., 1995; Lachmann and
Jablonka, 1996; Leimar et al., 2006; McNamara et al., 2016; Rivoire
and Leibler, 2014; Stamps and Frankenhuis, 2016). Nevertheless, in
these models the organism is born with a cue-driven-switch policy,
which it executes. Other types of plasticity, such as developmental se-
lection, have received far less theoretical attention (but see Arnold,
1978; Dridi and Lehmann, 2014, 2015; Enquist et al., 2016; Frank,
1996, 1997; Snell-Rood, 2012; Trimmer and Houston, 2014; Trimmer
et al., 2012; Whalen et al., 2015).
To this point, we have focused on different methods a researcher
can use to find or approximate an optimal policy. We have not dis-
cussed how a real animal acquires its behavioral strategy. Whether
innate or learned policies are favored will depend on the distribution of
environments faced by ancestral generations. If an environment
changes very slowly relative to an organism’s lifespan, remaining nearly
stable across generations, natural selection can build innate adapta-
tions, like the stripes on a zebra. However, if an environment changes at
a noticeable rate between generations, but slowly enough within gen-
erations for learning to be useful, there needs to be some division of
labor between evolutionary and developmental processes. What might
this division look like?
The answer depends on how slowly an environment changes re-
lative to an organism’s lifetime. If an organism effectively spends its
whole life in the same conditions and the number of different condi-
tions is very limited, natural selection might produce a policy that
‘switches’ an organism into one of several discrete phenotypes. Such
polyphenisms abound in nature, and include certain predator-induced
defences in amphibians and crustaceans (Gilbert and Baressi, 2016). In
this case, trait development may occur during a critical period and be
irreversible (Botero et al., 2015; English et al., 2016; Fawcett and
Frankenhuis, 2015; Frankenhuis and Fraley, 2017; Frankenhuis and
Panchanathan, 2011; Panchanathan and Frankenhuis, 2016; Fischer
et al., 2014; Pfab et al., 2016). Alternatively, if an organism is likely to
experience different conditions during its lifetime (e.g., due to migra-
tion or seasonality) and the number of different conditions is limited,
natural selection may favor a policy that contains instructions for each
condition and the ability to continuously ‘switch’ instructions based on
the current conditions. In this case, trait development may be reversible
without a critical period.
With irreversible and reversible switches, the organism does not
‘learn’ a policy. Natural selection ‘discovers’ and equips the organism
with a policy, which the organism then executes. By contrast, natural
selection may result in organisms that learn policies when the environ-
ment is highly complex, spanning a massive state space. The environ-
ment may include a great variety of different patches, each of which is
characterized by a different set of transition and reward probabilities,
which themselves may change during an organism’s lifetime (but not
too fast for learning to be useful). In such a complex ecology, natural
selection might favor developmental selection rather than a vast col-
lection of pre-specified strategies and a policy for choosing among
them, or it might favor a combination of innate instructions and de-
velopmental selection. For instance, the organism might use cues to
infer the current conditions, but when this fails, switch to a develop-
mental selection strategy. In any case, for developmental selection to be
adaptive, there needs to be enough repetition in the organism’s ex-
periences to provide a sufficient number of ‘learning trials’. When
learning involves prediction, future events need to be correlated with
past events. Further, the costs of actions should not be too high relative
to their benefits. In a foraging context, if locations are far apart or
traveling is dangerous, the cost of exploration may always outweigh the
marginal gain of finding a better location.
With developmental selection, the agent needs a means for evalu-
ating the consequences of its actions that works within its lifetime.
Reward systems, implemented by animal nervous systems, accomplish
this by ‘rewarding’ behavior that tends to lead to adaptive outcomes,
reinforcing the production of those behaviors (Barto, 2013; Dridi and
Akçay, 2018; Singh et al., 2009, 2010; Sorg, 2011; see also Cosmides
W.E. Frankenhuis et al. Behavioural Processes 161 (2019) 94–100
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and Tooby, 2013; Niv et al., 2002; Samuelson and Swinkels, 2006).
When reproductive success is a distal consequence of specific behaviors,
however, the relationship between reward systems and reproductive
success may not be easy to discern. Computational experiments using
RL methods designed to find reward systems that are optimally suited
to furthering reproductive success (possibly assessed by proxies, such as
foraging success) suggest that optimal reward systems are likely ex-
quisitely sensitive both to an agent’s own capabilities and limitations, as
well as to the distribution of environments in which the agent is likely
to find itself (Singh et al., 2009, 2010; Sorg, 2011). The experiments
just described explored a state space that would have been manageable
with SDP methods as well. However, if these experiments were ex-
tended to include more state variables (e.g., by making the internal
environment of the organism or its external environment more com-
plex, for instance, by adding further physical or social dimensions), RL
methods are likely to be up to the task, while SDP methods might not
be.
When modeling the evolution of reward systems, we must choose a
definition of fitness. As noted, empirical studies often measure fitness as
the survival and reproductive success of individuals. However, fitness
should be assigned to developmental systems (or strategies or geno-
types), not to individuals. Often, the long-term growth rate of a lineage
provides the appropriate measure of fitness (Donaldson-Matasci et al.,
2008; Lewontin and Cohen, 1969; McNamara et al., 2016; Starrfelt and
Kokko, 2012). This measure implies a particular fitness calculation (i.e.,
the geometric mean fitness of developmental systems across genera-
tions), which may favor different outcomes than a fitness calculation
based on individual survival and reproduction (i.e., the arithmetic
mean fitness across individuals within a generation). Incorporating this
insight into RL theorists’ studies of the evolution of reward systems,
which have relied on arithmetic mean fitness (e.g., Singh et al., 2009,
2010; Sorg, 2011), might be an interesting direction for future research.
The art of modeling is to decide which aspects of an organism and
its environment need to be modeled, and which ones can be left out.
These decisions depend on the aims and scope of a model (Levins, 1966;
Parker and Maynard Smith, 1990). “General models promote under-
standing of qualitative features. The parameters of such models may not
be easy to measure. Specific models are based on a particular system
and have parameters that can be measured so that predictions can be
made” (Houston and McNamara, 2005, p. 934; see also Frankenhuis
and Tiokhin, in press). For both types of models, it is often appropriate
to include a small number of state variables, resulting in a compliant
state space, which SDP methods can handle. However, in some cases we
want to study qualitative patterns that emerge with a larger number of
state variables, or quantitative predictions in messy, real-world ecolo-
gies. In such cases, behavioral ecology will benefit from drawing on RL
methods. Moreover, as RL methods are also well-suited to modeling
mechanistic instantiation, these methods hold great promise for
studying simple rules that perform well in complex environments, thus
illuminating the psychological mechanisms that real animals use in
their daily lives.
In summary, the main advantage of RL methods over SDP methods
is that they can find good policies for MDPs with massive state spaces
and with transition and reward functions that are unknown to the
modeler, so that simulation is easier than getting all the probabilities
needed for SDP. It is good for behavioral ecologists to know that RL
methods allow for more complexity than SDP methods. It remains an
open question, however, whether they will gain new insights, and if so
which ones, from being able to predict behavior in more complex sce-
narios. In any case, for those who want to explore large state spaces, RL
methods offer a rich and appropriate set of tools.
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